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Abstract
Factor models for portfolio credit risk assume that defaults are independent condi-
tional on a small number of systematic factors. This paper shows that the conditional
independence assumption may be violated in one-factor models with constant default
thresholds, as conditional defaults become independent only including a set of observ-
able (time-lagged) risk factors. This result is conﬁrmed both when we consider semi-
annual default rates and if we focus on small ﬁrms. Maximum likelihood estimates for
the sensitivity of default rates to systematic risk factors are obtained, showing how they
may substantially vary across industry sectors. Finally, individual risk contributions
are derived through Monte Carlo simulation.
Keywords: Asset correlation, factor models, loss distribution, portfolio credit risk, risk
contributions.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G21, C13, C15
Address: Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi, Via del Plebiscito 102, 00186 Rome,
Italy, email:epalombini@ﬁtd.it1
1The author would like to thank Daniel Rösch and two anonymous referees for their comments to the
ﬁrst version of this paper. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reﬂect
those of the Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi.
1 Introduction
Estimating the credit risk of a portfolio of ﬁnancial instruments requires two types of inputs:
1) exposure-speciﬁc variables like probability of default, loss given default and exposure at
default; 2) the multivariate distribution of future credit events or, in other words, some
assumptions on both the marginal distribution and the dependence structure of variables
that may trigger defaults. The second type of inputs includes the estimation of correlations
between these variables, which are often interpreted as the obligors' asset values, as in the
credit risk model introduced by Merton (1974).
Correlations are particularly important because they limit the possibility to fully diversify
credit risk at a portfolio level. For large and diversiﬁed portfolios they represent the main
source of uncertainty about future losses, but their estimation is quite challenging, due to
the fact that asset returns are not observable. The existing literature oﬀers three alternatives
to solve this problem. First, a factor structure can be assumed for asset returns, and asset
correlations are derived from the covariance matrix of the chosen factors (Kealhofer and
Bohn, 2001). Second, the rapid development of the credit derivatives market allows to derive
the correlations implicit in the prices of such instruments (Tarashev and Zhu, 2006). Third,
asset correlations can be obtained from historical data on defaults and credit transitions.
When default data are used, asset correlations can be derived from default correlations
using non parametric approaches as in Lucas (1995) or in Gordy (2000). Alternatively, asset
correlations are obtained directly from default data, through maximum likelihood estimation;
this approach is introduced by Gordy and Heitﬁeld (2002) and then used in various papers,
among which Düllmann and Scheule (2003) and Rösch and Scheule (2004). An important
advantage of parametric methodologies is that structural restrictions arising from theoretical
assumptions can be easily incorporated in the model. Furthermore, deterministic explanatory
variables like macroeconomic factors can be considered together with unobservable random
factors.
Many empirical works and applications, including the Basel II regulatory framework, are
based on the model proposed by Vasicek (1997). Asset returns are assumed to be jointly
Gaussian distributed and defaults occur when they fall below a constant threshold. A crucial
assumption of one-factor models is that defaults are independent conditional on the (single)
common risk factor. As suggested by Schönbucher (2000) this assumption should be carefully
checked, as a violation could lead to an underestimation of tail probabilities.
Our empirical results show that in the one-factor framework the hypothesis of conditional
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independence between defaults is violated, and that the introduction of a set of deterministic
explanatory variables is necessary. This evidence is conﬁrmed also when we use semi-annual
data on default rates, thus obtaining estimates based on a considerably longer time series
of defaults. Similar results are also found estimating a speciﬁc model for small enterprises,
even if sensitivities to economic conditions tend to decrease.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the two-state factor model used
in the following analysis. Section 3 presents our empirical results, how they vary according
to the industry and the size of the obligor, and also according to the length of the horizon
considered. In Section 4 individual contributions to portfolio credit risk are obtained through
Monte Carlo simulation.
2 A credit risk model with factor structure
Consider a portfolio of exposures where the normalized return on the assets of obligor i at
time t, with i ∈ {, ..., nt} and t ∈ {, ..., T}, is driven by both observable (time-lagged) and
unobservable risk factors:
Ri,t = α
′Zt−1 + Ui,t (1)
where the vector Zt−1 represents a set of information available at time t−1 to estimate the
default probability of obligor i. It may include obligor-speciﬁc variables as well as factors that
aﬀect the credit quality of the whole portfolio. The unobservable variable Ui,t is inﬂuenced
by a one-dimensional systematic factor Yt and by a ﬁrm-speciﬁc component Ei,t:
Ui,t =
√
δYt +
√
1− δEi,t (2)
where Yt and Ei,t follow standard normal distributions. All variables in equations (1) and
(2) are assumed to be independent and each Ei,t is also independent across obligors. There-
fore, conditional on the realizations of common risk factors, defaults are independent. From
equation (2) it follows that the sensitivity of asset returns to the systematic unobservable
risk factor depends on the time-invariant parameter δ, which represents the so-called asset
correlation.
The default of a ﬁrm occurs when the return on its assets falls below a threshold k, and
let the random variable Di,t be a default indicator, i.e., a variable that is equal to one if ﬁrm
i is in default at time t and zero otherwise:
2
Di,t = 1⇐⇒ Ri,t < k (3)
Conditional on the realization of common risk factors, the default probability can be
expressed as:
pi,t (zt−1, yt) = P (Ri,t < k | zt−1, yt)
= P (α′zt−1 + Ui,t < k)
= P
(
α′zt−1 +
√
δyt +
√
1− δEi,t < k
)
= Φ
(
k −α′zt−1 −
√
δyt√
1− δ
)
(4)
where Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative density function.
As the number of borrowers grows, if the share of the largest exposure vanishes to zero,
the default rate DRt converges to the conditional default probability by the strong law of
large numbers:
DRt → E [DRt | zt−1, yt] = pi,t (zt−1, yt) (5)
Φ−1 (DRt)→ k −α
′zt−1√
1− δ −
√
δ√
1− δ yt (6)
For a given q ∈ (0, 1), let ψq(Y ) denote the qth percentile of the distribution of the random
variable Y . If the expected default rate is monotonically decreasing in the systematic random
factor, the qth percentile of its distribution can be expressed as (Gordy 2003):
ψq(E [DRt | zt−1, Yt]) = E [DRt | zt−1, ψq(Yt)] (7)
Given a database of default data, assuming that the random factor is independently and
identically distributed over time, the parameters in equation (4) can be estimated maximizing
the log-likelihood function:
lnL =
T∑
t=1
ln
+∞∫
−∞
{∏
i∈Nt
pi,t (zt−1, yt)
di,t (1− pi,t (zt−1, yt))1−di,t
}
dΦ (yt) (8)
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The integrals in equation (8) can be solved approximately using the adaptive Gaussian
quadrature described in Pinheiro and Bates (1995). It follows from the general theory of
maximum likelihood estimation that the estimates exist asymptotically, and are consistent
as well as asymptotically normally distributed (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993).
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data
This paper uses a time series of default data coming from the Base Informativa Pubblica
(BIP), a database provided by the Bank of Italy containing quarterly time series for the
number of defaults and the number of loans that were not in default at the beginning of the
period, starting in 1990. The number of defaults in a given quarter is given by the number
of borrowers that become "adjusted bad debtors" during that quarter.2
In the BIP database borrowers can be distinguished according to several variables like
industry sector and geographical location. In this paper we focus on non-ﬁnancial companies,
as divided between the ﬁfteen industries listed in Table 1, which also shows the average
number of ﬁrms and the average default rate.
3.2 Parameter estimates
The credit risk model described in Section 2 relies on the crucial assumption that, conditional
on common risk factors, defaults are independent. If this were not the case, i.e. if systematic
factors did not capture all the correlation between defaults, maximizing the log-likelihood
function in equation (8) would lead to an underestimation of tail probabilities.
As a test of our model we can use the fact that, under the conditional independence
assumption, as the number of borrowers grows the default rate DRt converges to the con-
ditional default probability. Since the number of borrowers in our dataset is large enough
to represent a reasonable approximation of an inﬁnitely granular portfolio, we can use (6)
2According to the deﬁnition used by the Bank of Italy a borrower becomes an adjusted bad debtor if
reported to the Italian Central Credit Register: a) as a bad debt by the only bank that disbursed credit; b)
as a bad debt by one bank and as having an overshoot by the only other bank exposed; c) as a bad debt by
one bank and the amount of the bad debt is at least 70% of its exposure towards the banking system, or as
having overshoots equal to or more than 10% of its total loans outstanding; d) as a bad debt by at least two
banks for amounts equal to or more than 10% of its total loans outstanding.
Further information about the dataset and the Italian Central Credit Register is available at the Bank of
Italy's website.
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Table 1: Industry sectors
Average number of borrowers and
average default rate (1990-2008)
N %DR
1 Agricultural, forestry and ﬁshery products 48,651 1.85
2 Metal products, except transport equip. 31,742 1.68
3 Food and tobacco products 17,113 2.45
4 Textiles, clothing and footwear 30,602 2.93
5 Paper and paper products 10,793 2.18
6 Building and construction 95,055 2.77
7 Trade services, recovery and repair services 172,580 2.38
8 Lodging and catering services 35,893 2.21
9 Other market services 117,178 1.84
10 Fuel, power products and chemical products 6,850 1.67
11 Ores and metals and non-metallic minerals and products 15,450 2.09
12 Agricultural and industrial machinery and transport equip. 22,631 1.91
13 Electrical goods, oﬃce and data processing machines 16,351 2.17
14 Other manufactured products 34,594 2.07
15 Transport and communication services 28,480 2.37
and run a regression of Φ−1 (DRt) on a constant and a set of potential explanatory vari-
ables. Then, we can investigate the properties of the residuals, in particular checking if the
assumptions of normality and serial independence are violated.
We start considering the one-factor version of the Vasicek model, thus imposing α′ =
0, as this model is used in many empirical works and applications, including the Basel
II regulatory framework. In fact, when correlation estimates are obtained through non-
parametric approaches, as in Gordy (2000) or de Servigny and Renault (2002), asset returns
are assumed to be jointly Gaussian distributed and defaults occur when they fall below a
constant threshold.
If we run a regression of Φ−1 (DRt) on a constant, the correlogram of residuals provides
strong evidence of serial correlation. Table 2 shows autocorrelations and partial autocorre-
lations up to 12 lags, together with the Ljung-Box Q-statistics for the null hypothesis of no
autocorrelation, which is strongly rejected. This can be explained by the fact that default
rates are likely to depend on their past values due to the persistence of economic shocks and
because of possible contagion eﬀects.
In order to eliminate any serial correlation we include the (percentage) lagged default rate
in the model. The coeﬃcient of the new variable is highly signiﬁcant, the model's ﬁt improves
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Table 2: Linear regression for default rate (1)
Parameter estimates Correlogram of residuals
Variable Estimate Pr > |t| Lag AC PAC. Q-Stat p-value
Intercept -2.015 0.000 1 0.897 0.897 17.842 0.000
2 0.721 -0.427 30.058 0.000
Tests for zero-mean residuals 3 0.507 -0.207 36.479 0.000
Test Statistic p-value 4 0.305 0.016 38.946 0.000
Sign -0.5 1.000 5 0.102 -0.208 39.246 0.000
Wilkoxon 0 1.000 6 -0.072 -0.034 39.406 0.000
7 -0.210 -0.008 40.872 0.000
Tests for normality of residuals 8 -0.304 -0.060 44.235 0.000
Test Statistic p-value 9 -0.375 -0.135 49.852 0.000
Shapiro-Wilk 0.876 0.018 10 -0.406 0.042 57.153 0.000
D'Agostino-Stephens 3.606 0.165 11 -0.406 -0.050 65.373 0.000
12 -0.378 -0.055 73.535 0.000
and the correlogram shows that we have almost eliminated correlation between residuals
(Table 3). To verify if residuals are normally distributed we perform two statistical tests,
Shapiro-Wilk and D'Agostino-Pearson (see D'Agostino and Stephens, 1986 for a discussion).
In both cases the normality assumption is rejected at very high conﬁdence levels, suggesting
that we should extend our set of explanatory variables.
Table 3: Linear regression for default rate (2)
Parameter estimates Correlogram of residuals
Variable Estimate Pr > |t| Lag AC PAC. Q-Stat p-value
Intercept -2.396 0.000 1 0.376 0.376 2.987 0.084
%DRt−1 0.165 0.000 2 0.193 0.061 3.829 0.147
3 -0.102 -0.225 4.077 0.253
Tests for zero-mean residuals 4 0.056 0.185 4.157 0.385
Test Statistic p-value 5 -0.159 -0.233 4.858 0.434
Sign -3 0.238 6 -0.140 -0.087 5.446 0.488
Wilkoxon -23.5 0.325 7 -0.229 -0.057 7.159 0.412
8 -0.102 -0.055 7.534 0.480
Tests for normality of residuals 9 -0.077 0.023 7.769 0.558
Test Statistic p-value 10 -0.037 -0.074 7.831 0.645
Shapiro-Wilk 0.848 0.008 11 0.059 0.127 8.012 0.712
D'Agostino-Stephens 13.185 0.001 12 -0.046 -0.201 8.138 0.774
In order to choose an additional independent variable we consider the log-changes of a
broad set of key economic indicators for Italy - including GDP, industrial production, new
6
orders to manufacturing, gross ﬁxed capital formation, household conﬁdence, a composite
leading indicator and real interest rates - as measured at various quarterly lags and over
diﬀerent time horizons ranging from two to four quarters. It turns out that the semi-annual
log-change of household conﬁdence calculated at the end of the previous year is the variable
that, together with a constant and the lagged default rate, maximizes our model's ﬁt. An
analysis of the possible reasons why household conﬁdence shows the best predictive power
among the selected macroeconomic variables goes beyond the scope of this paper, but this
result is probably due to its anticipatory nature, as conﬁrmed by the fact that the leading
economic indicator has a similar performance.
Table 4 shows that all coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant with the expected sign (default rates
increase when economic conditions deteriorate) and, ﬁnally, that the normality hypothesis
for the residuals cannot be rejected even at quite low conﬁdence levels. We also check the
zero-mean assumption for our residuals performing the sign test and the Wilkoxon signed
rank test; in both cases the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at very low conﬁdence levels.
Table 4: Linear regression for default rate (3)
Parameter estimates Correlogram of residuals
Variable Estimate Pr > |t| Lag AC PAC Q-Stat p-value
Intercept -2.441 0.000 1 0.218 0.218 1.003 0.317
%DRt−1 0.187 0.000 2 0.167 0.126 1.633 0.442
Houseconf t−1 -1.806 0.000 3 0.003 -0.060 1.633 0.652
Tests for zero-mean residuals 4 -0.178 -0.201 2.445 0.655
Test Statistic p-value 5 -0.019 0.068 2.455 0.783
Sign 0 1.000 6 -0.296 -0.271 5.090 0.532
Wilkoxon -3.5 0.899 7 -0.110 -0.014 5.486 0.601
8 -0.313 -0.291 9.016 0.341
Tests for normality of residuals 9 -0.109 0.039 9.490 0.393
Test Statistic p-value 10 0.027 -0.005 9.522 0.483
Shapiro-Wilk 0.969 0.775 11 -0.054 -0.062 9.675 0.560
D'Agostino-Stephens 1.004 0.605 12 0.176 0.026 11.542 0.483
We ﬁnally have a model that meets all the assumptions discussed in section 2, thus we can
derive risk estimates as quantile measures of our loss distribution using equation (7). In order
to do so, we need to estimate the correlation parameter that measures the sensitivity of asset
returns to the random risk factor, the so-called asset correlation. This can be done either
considering the variance of the residuals of our regression or maximizing the log-likelihood
function in equation (8).
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Table 5 shows our maximum likelihood estimates for the entire portfolio and for each
industry sector separately3. The highest (unconditional) default probabilities, indicated by
the largest default thresholds, are found for sectors 4 and 15. Comparatively low default
probabilities are found for sectors 9 and 10. Asset correlation, as expressed by the sensitivity
of asset returns to the unobservable common risk factor is never signiﬁcant at the 99% level,
except for the whole portfolio, and it is not signiﬁcant at the 90% level in three cases; its
highest values are 0.42% for sector 12 and 0.38% for sector 2. Serial dependence between
default rates turns out to be quite relevant in industries 1, 6 and 9, whilst it is not signiﬁcant
at the 95% level for sector 4. The log-change in household conﬁdence performs fairly well, as
it is signiﬁcant at the 99% level in 11 sectors and it is below the 90% level only for Building
and construction and (marginally) for Fuel, power products and chemical products.
Table 5: Maximum likelihood estimates
Industry Constant Asset correlation %DRt−1 Houseconft−1
Est. Pr > |t| %Est. Pr > |t| Est. Pr > |t| Est. Pr > |t|
1 -2.472 0.000 0.279 0.034 0.203 0.000 -0.944 0.002
2 -2.451 0.000 0.379 0.017 0.128 0.000 -1.150 0.001
3 -2.214 0.000 0.023 0.452 0.104 0.000 -0.493 0.002
4 -2.029 0.000 0.367 0.013 0.045 0.059 -0.929 0.004
5 -2.314 0.000 0.301 0.043 0.121 0.000 -0.925 0.004
6 -2.474 0.000 0.228 0.011 0.223 0.000 -0.273 0.221
7 -2.380 0.000 0.134 0.012 0.156 0.000 -0.723 0.000
8 -2.473 0.000 0.156 0.036 0.194 0.000 -0.483 0.031
9 -2.618 0.000 0.114 0.016 0.210 0.000 -0.781 0.000
10 -2.518 0.000 0.171 0.168 0.144 0.000 -0.450 0.104
11 -2.400 0.000 0.051 0.231 0.137 0.000 -0.792 0.000
12 -2.362 0.000 0.424 0.017 0.113 0.000 -1.154 0.001
13 -2.300 0.000 0.154 0.056 0.116 0.000 -0.699 0.004
14 -2.320 0.000 0.277 0.018 0.114 0.000 -1.006 0.001
15 -2.105 0.000 0.297 0.021 0.053 0.022 -0.578 0.042
All -2.413 0.000 0.092 0.009 0.163 0.000 -0.726 0.000
In general, the results in Table 5 suggest that sensitivities to risk factors vary across
borrowers, according to the industry in which they operate. If this were the case, the portfolio
composition could signiﬁcantly aﬀect our risk estimates and risk contributions would diﬀer
across industries. This issue can be formally investigated through statistical tests, as the
ratio of any estimate in Table 5 with its standard error produces a t-value, with approximate
3Serial independence and normality of residuals were also checked at industry level.
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Table 6: Statistical tests for ML estimates
H0 :Industry estimates are equal to portfolio estimates
Industry Intercept Asset corr. %DRt−1 Houseconft−1
1 4.504 6.527 7.405 3.239
2 2.688 8.544 5.836 5.803
3 23.969 7.075 16.731 5.286
4 27.965 8.765 20.521 2.879*
5 7.176 6.440 6.431 2.791*
6 5.384 6.908 12.911 7.775
7 3.504 3.165 1.655* 0.055*
8 5.655 3.705 6.996 4.317
9 22.485 1.790* 12.567 1.170*
10 8.085 2.794* 3.481 4.073
11 1.442* 3.423 6.709 1.388*
12 3.440 8.908 8.181 5.642
13 10.408 3.324 10.214 0.461*
14 7.444 7.288 9.263 4.325
15 23.830 7.372 20.236 2.172*
* indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 99% level
degrees of freedom computed as the number of observations minus one. Table 6 shows the
values of the relevant t-statistics under the null hypothesis that sensitivities estimated at
industry level are equal to those estimated for the entire portfolio, which is rejected at the
99% conﬁdence level in most cases.
Considering the important role played by common risk factors, it may be useful to per-
form some sensitivity analysis of portfolio credit risk with respect to their coeﬃcients. In
particular, we consider the values of such coeﬃcients at the 90th, 95th and 99th percentiles
of their distribution and calculate 99.9% VaR using equation (7)4. Estimated sensitivities
to systematic risk factors may have a signiﬁcant impact on portfolio credit risk: when we
consider 90% level values our risk measure may increase by more than 7%, but if we consider
99% level values its increases range between 24% and 26% (Table 7).
3.3 Portfolio credit risk and time horizon
In this section we repeat the empirical analysis of section 3.2 using semi-annual default data.
Estimating portfolio credit risk over short horizons (less than one year) may be useful for
4For observable risk factors the results of sensitivity analysis are time-varying, as they depend on the
value of the corresponding variable.
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Table 7: Sensitivity of V aR99.9% to ML estimates
(% default rates for 2009)
Percentile
50th 90th 95th 99th
All 2.246
Random factor 2.378 2.676 2.786
%DRt−1 2.419 2.688 2.827
Houseconft−1 2.327 2.668 2.779
two reasons: ﬁrst, it allows to generate short-term portfolio loss distributions, which can be
used to price ﬁnancial instruments with quarterly or semi-annual cash ﬂows (e.g. portfolio
credit derivatives); second, it gives the opportunity to obtain one-year loss distributions
using parameters estimated from a much larger number of observations.
Portfolio credit risk increases with horizon because of 1) an increase in default probabili-
ties with constant asset correlations or 2) an increase in both (Lucas, 1995). In other words,
defaults tend to cluster over longer horizons due solely to an increase in the marginal proba-
bilities of default events, or also because they are more ﬁrm-speciﬁc over short horizons, but
more triggered by systematic factors over longer time periods. For instance, Zhou (1997)
shows that, as the horizon lengthens, an increase in default correlations may be solely due
to an increase in default probabilities, with constant asset correlations.
Our results for semi-annual default rates conﬁrm the empirical ﬁndings of section 3.2.
Data exhibit serial correlation that can be eliminated including lagged default rates in the
model, but residuals remain highly non-normal (Tables 8 and 9).
We repeat the selection process aimed at ﬁnding an additional explanatory variable and,
as in section 3.2, the lagged semi-annual log-change of household conﬁdence turns out to
be the one that maximizes our regression's ﬁt. The coeﬃcient of the new variable is highly
signiﬁcant, with the expected sign, and we can no longer reject the hypothesis that residuals
are normally distributed (Table 10).
Table 11 shows our maximum likelihood estimates for the entire portfolio and for each
industry sector separately5. Asset correlation, as expressed by the sensitivity of asset returns
to the unobservable common risk factor is now signiﬁcant at the 99% level for eight industries
(and for the whole portfolio); its highest value is 0.37% for sectors 4 and 6. Serial dependence
between default rates is even more relevant, as it is always signiﬁcant at the 99% level. On
the contrary, the log-change in household conﬁdence shows a lower predictive power, as it is
5Serial independence and normality of residuals were also checked at industry level.
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Table 8: Linear regression for semi-annual default rate (1)
Parameter estimates Correlogram of residuals
Variable Estimate Pr > |t| Lag AC PAC. Q-Stat p-value
Intercept -2.292 0.000 1 0.944 0.944 36.604 0.000
2 0.872 -0.172 68.732 0.000
Tests for zero-mean residuals 3 0.796 -0.067 96.225 0.000
Test Statistic p-value 4 0.715 -0.073 119.07 0.000
Sign -3 0.418 5 0.604 -0.326 135.86 0.000
Wilkoxon -11.5 0.870 6 0.498 0.049 147.63 0.000
7 0.400 0.004 155.49 0.000
Tests for normality of residuals 8 0.301 -0.115 160.07 0.000
Test Statistic p-value 9 0.207 0.073 162.32 0.000
Shapiro-Wilk 0.893 0.002 10 0.104 -0.250 162.91 0.000
D'Agostino-Stephens 8.101 0.017 11 0.010 -0.017 162.91 0.000
12 -0.068 0.122 163.18 0.000
Table 9: Linear regression for semi-annual default rate (2)
Parameter estimates Correlogram of residuals
Variable Estimate Pr > |t| Lag AC PAC. Q-Stat p-value
Intercept -2.639 0.000 1 0.114 0.114 0.5197 0.471
%DRt−1 0.304 0.000 2 0.088 0.076 0.8395 0.657
3 0.024 0.006 0.8640 0.834
Tests for zero-mean residuals 4 0.273 0.268 4.1295 0.389
Test Statistic p-value 5 -0.018 -0.084 4.1441 0.529
Sign -5.5 0.099 6 -0.114 -0.155 4.7446 0.577
Wilkoxon -56.5 0.401 7 -0.040 -0.004 4.8213 0.682
8 -0.008 -0.063 4.8246 0.776
Tests for normality of residuals 9 0.193 0.260 6.7449 0.664
Test Statistic p-value 10 -0.042 -0.016 6.8378 0.741
Shapiro-Wilk 0.898 0.003 11 -0.140 -0.209 7.9298 0.720
D'Agostino-Stephens 14.695 0.001 12 -0.048 -0.008 8.0651 0.780
signiﬁcant at the 99% level in only six sectors and it is below the 90% level in four cases. In
general, however, the results in Table 11 conﬁrm that sensitivities to risk factors substantially
vary across industries.
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Table 10: Linear regression for semi-annual default rate (3)
Parameter estimates Correlogram of residuals
Variable Estimate Pr > |t| Lag AC PAC Q-Stat p-value
Intercept -2.653 0.000 1 -0.072 -0.072 0.2082 0.648
%DRt−1 0.315 0.000 2 0.109 0.105 0.7017 0.704
Houseconft−1 -0.379 0.000 3 0.018 0.033 0.7152 0.870
4 0.236 0.232 3.1454 0.534
Tests for zero-mean residuals 5 -0.058 -0.032 3.2950 0.655
Test Statistic p-value 6 0.020 -0.035 3.3134 0.769
Sign -4.5 0.188 7 -0.040 -0.053 3.3903 0.847
Wilkoxon -25.5 0.706 8 0.007 -0.052 3.3926 0.907
9 0.053 0.086 3.5382 0.939
Tests for normality of residuals 10 0.117 0.149 4.2678 0.934
Test Statistic p-value 11 -0.214 -0.206 6.7984 0.815
Shapiro-Wilk 0.966 0.300 12 -0.007 -0.070 6.8014 0.870
D'Agostino-Stephens 1.100 0.577
Table 11: Maximum likelihood estimates - semi-annual data
Industry Constant Asset correlation %DRt−1 Houseconft−1
Est. Pr > |t| %Est. Pr > |t| Est. Pr > |t| Est. Pr > |t|
1 -2.715 0.000 0.174 0.019 0.398 0.000 -0.655 0.000
2 -2.715 0.000 0.361 0.001 0.286 0.000 -0.616 0.005
3 -2.465 0.000 0.063 0.123 0.196 0.000 -0.338 0.014
4 -2.331 0.000 0.372 0.001 0.131 0.000 -0.567 0.007
5 -2.595 0.000 0.145 0.069 0.271 0.000 -0.560 0.003
6 -2.669 0.000 0.374 0.000 0.381 0.000 -0.169 0.382
7 -2.628 0.000 0.090 0.001 0.307 0.000 -0.448 0.000
8 -2.697 0.000 0.097 0.027 0.356 0.000 -0.087 0.519
9 -2.830 0.000 0.138 0.001 0.397 0.000 -0.323 0.012
10 -2.748 0.000 0.049 0.570 0.275 0.000 -0.197 0.284
11 -2.647 0.000 0.060 0.186 0.275 0.000 -0.429 0.003
12 -2.640 0.000 0.364 0.002 0.263 0.000 -0.501 0.019
13 -2.565 0.000 0.136 0.025 0.242 0.000 -0.323 0.042
14 -2.594 0.000 0.245 0.002 0.255 0.000 -0.447 0.013
15 -2.386 0.000 0.275 0.003 0.121 0.000 -0.139 0.463
All -2.652 0.000 0.084 0.000 0.315 0.000 -0.378 0.000
3.4 Portfolio credit risk and ﬁrm size
The results of Section 3.2 are not necessarily valid for small companies, as they have, on
average, a less diversiﬁed portfolio of assets than large companies, thus they may show a
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lower sensitivity to systematic risk factors. In the Basel II IRB approach, for instance,
asset correlation is an increasing function of the size of the obligor, as measured by its
yearly turnover6. The results in Düllmann and Scheule (2003) and Lopez (2003) show that
asset correlations increase with ﬁrm size, whilst Dietsch and Petey (2004) ﬁnd a U-shaped
relationship between the two variables. These conclusions, however, can be inﬂuenced by
the fact that small enterprises operate mainly in industries that are less cyclical, whereas
large ﬁrms prevail in sectors more dependent on macroeconomic conditions, leading small
companies to show lower systematic risk.
The database used in this paper allows to distinguish only loans to sole proprietorships
with up to 5 employees as a proxy for the small business sector. Even if such a category
corresponds more to a deﬁnition of micro-enterprise, it can be used to repeat the analysis of
section 3.2 and check if the results vary with ﬁrm size.
As for larger ﬁrms, if we run a regression of Φ−1 (DRt) on a constant, the correlogram
of residuals provides strong evidence of serial correlation, which can be eliminated including
the (percentage) lagged default rate in the model (Tables 12 and 13).
Table 12: Linear regression for default rate - small ﬁrms (1)
Parameter estimates Correlogram of residuals
Variable Estimate Pr > |t| Lag AC PAC. Q-Stat p-value
Intercept -2.008 0.000 1 0.804 0.804 14.321 0.000
2 0.626 -0.057 23.510 0.000
Tests for zero-mean residuals 3 0.438 -0.135 28.291 0.000
Test Statistic p-value 4 0.275 -0.061 30.301 0.000
Sign -0.5 1.000 5 0.146 -0.024 30.909 0.000
Wilkoxon 0 1.000 6 -0.026 -0.238 30.929 0.000
7 -0.185 -0.150 32.065 0.000
Tests for normality of residuals 8 -0.336 -0.151 36.155 0.000
Test Statistic p-value 9 -0.444 -0.096 44.010 0.000
Shapiro-Wilk 0.917 0.098 10 -0.394 0.276 50.896 0.000
D'Agostino-Stephens 5.576 0.062 11 -0.357 -0.060 57.268 0.000
12 -0.369 -0.279 65.050 0.000
It is interesting to notice that, with respect to larger ﬁrms, departures from normality
are less evident, suggesting that for some sub-portfolios it may not be necessary to include
additional variables to meet the conditional independence assumption. The coeﬃcient of the
6Asset correlation is a strictly increasing function of the obligor's turnover only if this is not below 5
million euro, and not above 50 million euro.
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Table 13: Linear regression for default rate - small ﬁrms (2)
Parameter estimates Correlogram of residuals
Variable Estimate Pr > |t| Lag AC PAC. Q-Stat p-value
Intercept -2.380 0.000 1 0.238 0.238 1.1990 0.274
%DRt−1 0.164 0.000 2 0.116 0.063 1.5027 0.472
3 0.093 0.055 1.7081 0.635
Tests for zero-mean residuals 4 -0.078 -0.125 1.8631 0.761
Test Statistic p-value 5 0.170 0.220 2.6673 0.751
Sign -3 0.238 6 0.078 0.000 2.8520 0.827
Wilkoxon -15.5 0.523 7 -0.077 -0.123 3.0484 0.880
8 -0.015 -0.020 3.0568 0.931
Tests for normality of residuals 9 -0.247 -0.209 5.5045 0.788
Test Statistic p-value 10 -0.144 -0.050 6.4348 0.778
Shapiro-Wilk 0.897 0.050 11 -0.001 0.045 6.4348 0.843
D'Agostino-Stephens 3.417 0.181 12 -0.120 -0.066 7.2983 0.837
semi-annual log-change in household conﬁdence is not signiﬁcant at the 99% level, conﬁrming
that small ﬁrms are less inﬂuenced by systematic risk factors, but the normality hypothesis
for the residuals cannot be rejected even at quite low conﬁdence levels (Table 14).
Table 14: Linear regression for default rate - small ﬁrms (3)
Parameter estimates Correlogram of residuals
Variable Estimate Pr > |t| Lag AC PAC Q-Stat p-value
Intercept -2.388 0.000 1 0.079 0.079 0.131 0.718
%DRt−1 0.162 0.000 2 -0.108 -0.114 0.391 0.822
Houseconft−1 -0.314 0.092 3 0.250 0.273 1.887 0.596
4 -0.056 -0.134 1.967 0.742
Tests for zero-mean residuals 5 -0.015 0.083 1.973 0.853
Test Statistic p-value 6 0.087 -0.020 2.202 0.900
Sign -2 0.481 7 0.109 0.178 2.591 0.920
Wilkoxon -9.5 0.702 8 0.015 -0.049 2.599 0.957
9 -0.190 -0.184 4.041 0.909
Tests for normality of residuals 10 -0.212 -0.265 6.054 0.811
Test Statistic p-value 11 -0.034 -0.004 6.114 0.866
Shapiro-Wilk 0.938 0.272 12 -0.151 -0.147 7.480 0.824
D'Agostino-Stephens 0.428 0.808
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4 Risk contributions
Risk managers are typically interested in estimating not only the overall risk of a portfolio,
but also the contribution of individual exposures to such risk. In fact, individual risk con-
tributions are a a key input for setting pricing limits, calculating risk-adjusted performances
and for capital allocation decisions.
Marginal risk contributions can be represented as conditional expected losses (Tasche,
1999). Let Li be the loss from obligor i and L the total loss in the portfolio; assuming
P (L = V aRα) > 0, the marginal V aRα contribution from obligor i can be expressed as:
E (Li | L = V aRα) (9)
In the model described in section 2 individual expected losses are equal for all exposures,
as both default thresholds and sensitivities to common risk factors are assumed to be con-
stant across borrowers. The empirical results in section 3.2 show that these assumptions are
acceptable when calculating an overall portfolio risk measure. On the contrary, when we es-
timate individual risk contributions, the same assumptions should be relaxed, as incremental
risk for a borrower with a higher PD (or asset correlation) is, ceteris paribus, greater than
incremental risk for a borrower with a lower PD (or asset correlation).
In this section we consider a ﬁctitious portfolio of 7,500 loans, where all industries are
equally represented, and we estimate risk contributions for each sector. In order to do that,
we use maximum likelihood estimates of correlations and default probabilities to approximate
the loss distribution by Monte Carlo simulation.
We draw an independent standard normal variable for each exposure and a vector from
the multivariate normal distribution of common risk factors Y ∼ N(0,Ω), where Ω is the
covariance matrix of the empirical estimates of systematic factors in diﬀerent industries. We
calculate the asset return for each exposure, we compare it to the default threshold, and
determine the default indicator (one for default, zero otherwise). The portfolio loss for this
draw is given by the sum of default indicators of all exposures, thus assuming that loss
given default and exposure at default are always equal to one. To estimate the portfolio loss
distribution, to be interpreted as the distribution of the number of defaults in the portfolio,
we repeat this process many times.
Standard Monte Carlo methods are aﬀected by serious problems in estimating marginal
risk contributions, as these can be represented as conditional expected losses on subportfolios,
conditioned on low-probability events. To address the problems deriving from the rarity
15
of large losses, we use an adaptation of the importance sampling procedure developed by
Glasserman and Li (2005) to estimate the tail of our loss distribution. The basic idea is
moving from the real probability measure P to a new probability measure P˜ , under which
large losses are more frequent. In particular, the probability for the total loss to be above a
certain value l can be expressed as:
P (L > l) = E
(
1{L>l}
)
= E˜
(
1{L>l}
dP
dP˜
)
(10)
where E˜ denotes the expectation under P˜ and dP
dP˜
is the likelihood ratio between the two
probability measures.
The procedure suggested by Glasserman and Li (2005) for credit risk models with factor
structure consists of two steps: 1) shifting the distribution of systematic factors; 2) increasing
conditional default probabilities.
In our model the estimated coeﬃcients of the unobservable common risk factors are very
low, thus we focus only on the second step of the importance sampling procedure. In partic-
ular, we consider a new (increased) default probability for industry j, with j ∈ {, ..., }:
p (θ, Yj) =
p (Yj) e
θ
1 + p (Yj) (eθ − 1) (11)
where θ is the solution to the equation:
∂
∂θ
ψ (θ,Y) = V aRα (12)
with
ψ (θ,Y) =
15∑
j=1
log
(
1 + p (Yj)
(
eθ − 1)) (13)
The likelihood ratio that allows to move from the probability measure P˜ back to the
original measure can be expressed as:
λ = exp (−θ (Y)L+ ψ (θ (Y) ,Y)) (14)
The V aRα contribution for obligors in sector j becomes:
V aRα,j =
E˜
(
Ljλ1{L=V aRα}
)
E˜
(
λ1{L=V aRα}
) (15)
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Table 15 reports the V aR99.9% contributions for each industry in our portfolio. The results
conﬁrm the key role played by sensitivities to common risk factors (both observable and
random) in determining individual risk contributions to portfolio credit risk. For instance,
sector 6 shows the third lowest unconditional PD (as indicated by the constant in Table 5)
but also a quite high autoregressive component, which reﬂects in its risk contribution. On
the contrary, sector 4 has the highest unconditional PD, but its risk contribution is reduced
by low serial dependence. As for asset correlation, we can notice that sector 3 shows a high
default probability, but a much lower risk contribution (in relative terms) due to its low
sensitivity to the random risk factor. (Tables 5 and 15).
Table 15: V aR99.9% contributions
Importance sampling estimates for 2009
(as % default rate)
99.9% conﬁdence intervals are in parentheses
Industry Annual Semi-annual
1 0.1908 (0.000473) 0.0848 (0.000379)
2 0.1665 (0.000445) 0.0788 (0.000373)
3 0.1680 (0.000413) 0.0904 (0.000381)
4 0.1696 (0.000449) 0.1538 (0.000536)
5 0.2045 (0.000488) 0.0866 0.000380)
6 0.1761 (0.000455) 0.0988 (0.000431)
7 0.1704 (0.000425) 0.0783 (0.000355)
8 0.1561 (0.000409) 0.0683 (0.000333)
9 0.1170 (0.000351) 0.0567 (0.000305)
10 0.1147 (0.000356) 0.0474 (0.000277)
11 0.1369 (0.000376) 0.0664 (0.000328)
12 0.1976 (0.000497) 0.0903 (0.000403)
13 0.1786 (0.000439) 0.0839 (0.000372)
14 0.1960 (0.000473) 0.0906 (0.000395)
15 0.2404 (0.000533) 0.1156 (0.000452)
When we consider semi-annual data, observable risk factors are less important in deter-
mining risk contributions, as lagged default rates are lower with respect to yearly data, but
also because changes in macroeconomic conditions do not fully display their eﬀects over short
horizons. At the same time, sensitivities to random factors have a relatively greater impact.
For instance, the risk contribution of sector 6 is very high compared to its PD, because of
a signiﬁcant asset correlation, whereas industries 7 and 11 display low risk contributions for
the opposite reason (Tables 11 and 15).
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5 Conclusions
This paper shows that measuring portfolio credit risk using the one-factor version of the
Vasicek model with constant default thresholds may lead to an underestimation of tail prob-
abilities, as a single systematic risk factor cannot capture all the correlation between asset
returns, leading to a violation of the conditional independence assumption. Instead, we
prove through statistical tests that factor models require the inclusion of deterministic ex-
planatory variables like macroeconomic factors and autoregressive components, together with
unobservable random factors. In fact, default rates are inﬂuenced by macroeconomic condi-
tions with a certain time-lag, but they also depend on their past values due to the persistence
of economic shocks and because of possible contagion eﬀects.
Sensitivities to risk factors vary across borrowers, according to the industry in which they
operate, therefore a change in the composition of a portfolio may signiﬁcantly aﬀect our risk
estimates. Serial dependence between default rates is quite relevant in all industries and it
is not signiﬁcant at the 99% level in only two cases. Macroeconomic conditions, as measured
by the log-change in household conﬁdence, also play a major role in most cases, but they are
not signiﬁcant at the 90% level for two sectors. Finally, asset correlation, as expressed by
the sensitivity of asset returns to the unobservable common risk factor, is never signiﬁcant
at the 99% level, except for the whole portfolio, and it is not signiﬁcant at the 90% level in
three cases.
The main results obtained with annual default rates are conﬁrmed by semi-annual data,
thus using a considerably longer series of observations. When we increase the frequency of
our data the autoregressive component becomes more important, but it is still not suﬃcient
to explain all the correlation between defaults.
Portfolio credit risk and sensitivities to systematic risk factors vary according to the size
of the borrower. If we compare the results obtained for small companies with the coeﬃcients
derived for larger ﬁrms, we observe that serial dependence between default rates remains
signiﬁcant, but macroeconomic conditions play a less important role.
Default thresholds and sensitivities to common risk factors can be assumed to be con-
stant across borrowers when calculating a single measure for portfolio credit risk. These
assumptions must be relaxed when we estimate individual risk contributions, which repre-
sent a fundamental input for pricing, calculating risk-adjusted performances and for capital
allocation decisions. Maximum likelihood estimates are used to derive the risk contribution
for each industry sector through Monte Carlo simulation and our results conﬁrm the key role
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played by sensitivities to common risk factors (both observable and random).
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